The Significance of Being Ethical: An essay on the case for moral realism and theism
Palabras clave
moral realism, moral anti-realism, objective moral facts, theism, William Irwin, Michael Ruse, E.O. WilsonResumen
William Irwin defends a form of moral anti-realism, according to which there are no objective moral facts. He contends that moral realism is objectionable because of its being more complex or not as simple as anti-realism; moral realism is in conflict with science; moral realism is also challenged by the fact that our moral judgements would differ if we were subject to a different biology or evolutionary past. Irwin also argues that insofar as moral realism is supportable evidentially by experience this would lead to the absurdity of thinking theism may be supported evidentially by religious experience. In response, it is argued that there are many truths (about logic and mathematics) and practices (such as science itself) that are not intelligible if there are no objective, normative truths and that objective moral truths are no more dispensable or odd than epistemic norms. It is further argued that Irwin's account of the evolution of morality is not able to escape presupposing objective moral facts (about harm and benefaction). Finally, the appeal to moral and religious experience is defended in making the case for moral realism and theism.
Citas
Irwin, William. The Free Market Existentialist (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2015).
Hospers, John. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. (Englewood New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967).
Kwan, K. The Rainbow of Experience, Critical Trust, and God. (New York: Continuum, 2011).
Ruse, Michael. Taking Darwin Seriously (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
Ruse, Michael and E.O. Wilson. “Moral Philosophy as Applied Science,” in Elliott Sober (ed) Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Taliaferro, Charles. “The Ordinary is Extraordinary: the Wonder of the Mundane Physical World,” Scientia et Fides 3 (2) 2015.
Wielenberg, Erik. “In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009).
Descargas
Publicado
Cómo citar
Número
Sección
Licencia
CC BY ND 4.0. The Creator/Contributor is the Licensor, who grants the Licensee a non-exclusive license to use the Work on the fields indicated in the License Agreement.
- The Licensor grants the Licensee a non-exclusive license to use the Work/related rights item specified in § 1 within the following fields: a) recording of Work/related rights item; b) reproduction (multiplication) of Work/related rights item in print and digital technology (e-book, audiobook); c) placing the copies of the multiplied Work/related rights item on the market; d) entering the Work/related rights item to computer memory; e) distribution of the work in electronic version in the open access form on the basis of Creative Commons license (CC BY-ND 3.0) via the digital platform of the Nicolaus Copernicus University Press and file repository of the Nicolaus Copernicus University.
- Usage of the recorded Work by the Licensee within the above fields is not restricted by time, numbers or territory.
- The Licensor grants the license for the Work/related rights item to the Licensee free of charge and for an unspecified period of time.
FULL TEXT License Agreement
Stats
Number of views and downloads: 407
Number of citations: 0