Rola przyczynowości w naukowych modelach wyjaśniania w kontekście powrotu do klasycznej koncepcji działania Boga w świecie
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/SetF.2020.010Schlagworte
Akauzalizm, Arystoteles, Bunge Mario, Działanie Boga w świecie, Kategorie determinacji, Kauzalizm, Modele wyjaśniania naukowego, Przyczynowość, SemikauzalizmAbstract
Zasadność powrotu do klasycznej koncepcji działania Boga w świecie w oparciu o katalog przyczyn i rozumienie przypadku w ujęciu Arystotelesa i jego komentatorów—w kontekście wiedzy o świecie czerpanej z nauk szczegółowych—wydaje się zależeć od tego, czy w teoretycznej warstwie modelu wyjaśniania przyjętego we współczesnym przyrodoznawstwie jest miejsce na analizę i wyjaśnianie przyczynowe. Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia pokrótce drogę od starożytnego i średniowiecznego kauzalizmu, poprzez akauzalizm nowożytnego empiryzmu oraz pozytywiwistycznych modeli wyjaśniania Hempla-Oppenheima, aż ku współczesnemu semikauzalnemu stanowisku zaproponowanemu przez Mario Bunge. Analiza postulowanych przez niego kategorii determinacji w wyjaśnianiu naukowym otwiera możliwość powrotu do klasycznego katalogu przyczyn Arystotelesa i jego komentatorów. Fakt ten pozwala bronić zwolenników klasycznego teizmu przed zarzutem błędu metodycznego w postaci narzucania na wyniki badań współczesnych nauk szczegółowych, odnoszącej się do starożytnych kategorii przyczynowości interpretacji filozoficznej, mającej niewiele wspólnego z aktualnym modelem wyjaśniania w przyrodoznawstwie.Literaturhinweise
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