Are the European Courts neutral between conceptions of a good life? ECHR, CJEU, and the moral neutrality in action
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/SIT.2022.009Keywords
neutrality, case law, morals, European courtsAbstract
In this article, I try to find the weaknesses of the methods of reasoning applied by the Courts in cases concerning moralistic laws. I argue that the main method used by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union is a procedural approach that refers directly to the principle of neutrality. In my critique, I rely on the findings of Michael J. Sandel, made in his analysis of the American case law in the area of morals. I suggest that, at least in some cases, procedural neutrality must be abandoned by the Courts in order to preserve substantive justice.
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Copyright (c) 2022 Kamil Jesiołowski
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