The two-fold nature of constitutional ontology from the perspective of the pure theory of law
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/TSP-W.2021.014Parole chiave
pure theory of law, constitutional ontology, Hans Kelsen, constitutionAbstract
The subject of the article is the issue of the political nature of the constitution and its scientific description from the point of view of pure Kelsen’s theory of law. We propose in it the thesis that although politics is not an object of legal knowledge, it is a necessary condition of the ontology of constitution. According to this theory, the cognition and description of the constitution (metaphorically speaking: its epistemology) relate to the content of valid norms, while its ontology consists of two elements: legal authorization and political will. The ontology of the constitution has a two-fold character: first, its creation and effectiveness is based primarily on the will of the constitution’s creator and on the will of entities applying the constitution (political aspect); secondly, its objectively validity presupposes that the creator of the constitution has a normative authorization to establish it (legal aspect). The inclusion by pure theory of law of the political at the ontological level is concomitant with its complete removal from the epistemological field. the consequence of such a cleansing of the cognitive field is, firstly, the dependence of the description on the condition of efficacy, i.e. ultimately on the acts of will of the subjects performing the functions of state organs, and, secondly, the ‘defencelessness’ in the event that the legal researcher finds a content incompatibility between the constitution and the acts of its application.
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