NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EUROZONE CRISIS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/TSP-W.2015.001Keywords
National parliaments, the Eurozone Crisis, The Fiscal Council, The Federal Constitutional Court, European Union, Fiscal TreatyAbstract
This article analyses if and how the position of national parliaments of selected member states has changed in reaction to the Euro-crisis by looking at the legal norms which regulate their role and powers in the new economic governance and at their first enforcement. It also tries to explain from which direction and institutions the changes in the parliamentary positions have been driven, whether on the part of the parliament itself or by other actors. Five national parliaments have been selected, namely the French, the German, the Italian, the Portuguese, and the Spanish Parliaments, in the light of the different inter-institutional relationship existing between the legislative and the executive branch and of the economic situation in these Eurozone countries.References
Auel K., Höing O. (2014), Parliaments in the Euro Crisis: Can the Losers of Integration Still Fight Back?, „Journal of Common Market Studies” 52, pp.1184–1193.
Bourrel R. (2013), La validation par le Conseil constitutionnel de la «nouvelle Constitution financière» de la France, „AJDA” 8, p. 478.
Calmfors L. (2011), The Role of Independent Fiscal Policy Institutions, „Center for Economic Studies Working Paper” 3367, Munich, pp. 19–20, available at: www.cesifo-group.org/ wp (last accessed on 6 October 2014).
Closa C., Maatsch A. (2014), In a Spirit of Solidarity? Justifying the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in National Parliamentary Debates, „Journal of Common Market Studies” 52, pp. 826–842.
Craig P. (2012), The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism, „European Law Review” 37, pp. 231 ff.
Crum B. (2013), Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy?, „Journal of Common Market Studies” 51, pp. 614–630.
Curtin D. (2014), Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy, „The Modern Law Review” 7, pp. 1–32.
García Roca J., Matínez Lago M. (2013), Estabilidad presupuestaria y consagración del freno constituticional ad endeudamiento, Pamplona, Aranzadi, pp. 73 ff.
Griglio E., Lupo N. (2012), Parliamentary Democracy and the Eurozone Crisis, „Law and Economics Early Review” 1, pp. 314–374.
Luciani M. (2012), Costituzione, bilancio, diritti e doveri dei cittadini, on-line access: Astrid.eu (september 2012) and Balaguer Callejón R. (2011), Presentación, „Revista de derecho constitucional europeo” 16.
Maduro M. (2012), A New Governance for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy and Justice, „Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Policy Paper” 11, p. 6 ff.
O’Brennan J., Raunio T. (2007), Deparliamentarization and European integration, in J. O’Brennan, T. Raunio (eds.), National parliaments within the enlarged European Union. From ‘victims’ of integration to competitive actors?, Routledge, London– –New York, pp. 1–26.
Pinelli C. (2014), La giurisprudenza costituzionale tedesca e le nuove asimmetrie fra i poteri dei parlamenti nazionali dell’eurozona, on-line acces: costituzionalismo. it (25 March 2014).
Tuori K., Tuori K. (2014), The Eurozone Crisis. A Constitutional Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 195.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
Stats
Number of views and downloads: 512
Number of citations: 0
