Transhumanist immortality: Understanding the dream as a nightmare
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.12775/SetF.2021.006Mots-clés
Immortalist fallacy, immortality, indefinite life, transhumanism.Résumé
This paper offers new arguments to reject the alleged dream of immortality. In order to do this, I firstly introduce an amendment to Michael Hauskeller’s approach of the “immortalist fallacy”. I argue that the conclusion “we (normally) do not want to live forever” does not follow from the premise “we (normally) do not want to die”. Next, I propose the philosophical turn from “normally” to “under these circumstances” to resolve this logical error. Then, I review strong philosophical critiques of this transhumanist purpose of immortality in the literature. There are two key questions related to the possibility of fulfilling this goal: the hard problem of consciousness and the personal identity dilemma. Finally, I defend a specific type of indefinite life and justify that it is more desirable than our current limited life.Références
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