La fiabilidad teórica del determinismo Un examen desde la propuesta de Mariano Artigas
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causalidad, ciencias experimentales, explicación, libertad humanaResumen
El presente artículo tiene dos finalidades. La primera es demostrar que la teoría del determinismo, que pretende fundarse en los principios de las ciencias experimentales, no puede ser considerada como una explicación compatible con tales ciencias. Para ello, utilizamos algunas ideas de Mariano Artigas sobre la capacidad explicativa de las teorías científicas y sobre su fiabilidad presentes en su libro La mente del universo. Con esto, buscamos alcanzar el segundo objetivo: mostrar la importancia de la obra de Artigas para la disolución de complejos debates contemporáneos, como es el caso de la actual discusión sobre la existencia de la libertad humana.Citas
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