Liberalizm polityczny. John Rawls wobec pluralizmu wartości

Abstract

The article is devoted to the value pluralism in modern societies and its consequences, especially the problems of state legitimization and stability. J. Rawls is the author of one of the most influential conception regarding these matters, called political liberalism. His idea was to find some noncontroversial basis for the liberal, democratic state, which could be accepted by the adherents of rational, moral or religious, doctrines. In my article, firstly, I present ?original position? as a key concept of Theory of justice which is later developed in Political liberalism. The main part of the article contains presentations of four, in my opinion principal, ideas of political liberalism: the fact of reasonable pluralism, overlapping consensus, division of public and private sphere, and neutrality principle. The criticism that stems from the liberal point of view completes the article. The objections raised by W. Galston and W. Kymlicka show that overlapping consensus could be very difficult to achieve due to the presence of closed, traditional communities. J. Gray accuses Rawls that he ignores many actual sources of pluralism, such as immigration, whereas R. Rorty claims that the whole theory of justice as fairness could be easily replaced by the concept of loyalty. In conclusion, using Berlin?s metaphor of fox and hedgehog, I raise a thesis, that the problem of pluralism cannot be resolved by one, universal conception, even such complex as political liberalism.