Reguły prawne jako istota pojęcia prawa w ujęciu H.L.A. Harta
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/SIT.2010.004Słowa kluczowe
the rules of law, legal positivism, primary and secondary rules, rules and principles, the rule of recognition, the internal and external point of view, political morality, the culture of law, the interpretative test, the test of coherenceAbstrakt
H.L.A. Hart is considered the most famous 20th century legal positivism philosopher. The main ideas of Hart’s conception of law are: the concept of legal rules and the distinction between an internal and external point of view of law. Hart defi nes the law as the concept of primary and secondary rules. The most important of the secondary rules is the rule of recognition which is used to examined and defi ne the rules as the legal ones. The Ronald Dworkin’s critic of Hart’s conception of law makes the other agree that rules are the main core of law but there are other norms present in legal system-principles. The question is: is this – even revised – concept of law the best defi nition of legal practice? Does the appliance of law refl ects this concept of law or the most important to understand this process is the culture of law and the political morality that develop principles?
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