Kant's cognitive constructiveness in knowledge and as the limit of law?

Abstract

Kant used Copernicus’ upheaval in thinking on astronomy to illustrate the profoundness of his critique of traditional metaphysics as ‘system of pure reason’. The consequence for philosophy is the following: the perspective of an eternally valid pure reason as a means of gaining knowledge of the world is abandoned – because this approach results not in knowledge, but only in dogmas. Instead, we engage with Kant in a change of perspective. It is grasped how the operative subject manages perception in a changing, agitated world. Instead of understanding perception merely as a mirroring, mimetic achievement, Kant moves to understanding perception as poiesis, as construction, as experimental philosophy. That means: to qualify as perception, something has to be shown to be contrivable, to be construable. This constructiveness of the active subject does not only shape processes of knowledge and perception, but also changes our environment through revolutionary processes in politics and society. Reason in revolutions becomes evident in constituting the legal practice of civil and human rights (Bill of Rights und Code civil).