Studies in the History of Philosophy <p>Quarterly of the Institute of Philosophy of the Nicolaus Copernicus University.</p><p>The journal is issued in an electronic and printed form. An electronic edition constitutes a reference version of the magazine.</p><p>Indexed on <strong>SCOPUS, DOAJ, The Philosopher`s Index, ERIH PLUS</strong>, and <strong>Index</strong> <strong>Copernicus</strong><strong> </strong>databases.</p><p>Scoring of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education: 20</p><p> </p><p>p-ISSN 2083-1978</p><p>e-ISSN 2391-775X</p> en-US (Tomasz Kupś) (Grzegorz Kopcewicz) Sat, 31 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0200 OJS 60 Berkeley`s "An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision” and his immaterialism <p>The article discuses George Berkeley’s An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision with respect to his immaterialism. The author concentrates on works written by Berkeley circa 1709: his Philosophical Commentaries, a work not meant for publication, and A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge published in 1710. The end of the article is to show, firstly, that it is beyond doubt that in 1709 Berkeley was a mature immaterialist, secondly, that the shape of his Essay, problematic for interpretation in the light of his later philosophy, derives indeed from the strategy adopted by him in order to prepare his readers for immaterialism. The author offers an interpretation, according to which technical parts of the Essay are subsidiary to Berkeley’s immaterialistic project and were intended to consolidate religion, and, moreover, notices that notions essential for Berkeley’s philosophy of 1710 are already present in the 1709 Essay. The author finally discusses Berkeley’s conception of the object as well as the problem of stability of experience, arising after the exclusion of external objects from the world.</p> Jacek Cieślak Copyright (c) 2021 Studies in the History of Philosophy Fri, 16 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Dialectics, Structure, Language – Lacanian “Return to Freud” in the First Half of the 1950s <p>The purpose of this article is to show the influence of Claude Levi-Strauss’structural anthropology and kojévian Hegelianism on Jacques Lacan’s early teaching. However, this is not just about showing the similarities between these theories, but <br />also about how these influences defined the shape of Lacan’s theory. It turns out that the influence that kojévian Hegelianism had on Lacan is not just a theoretical curiosity, but it constitutes the essence and the aim of Lacan’s clinical practice. The final conclusion of the article is the thesis that the essence of the early period of Lacan’s teaching can be defined as more Hegelian than structuralist. The essence <br />of this theory is not so much focus on Symbolic understood anthropologically, but reflection on the tension between the Universal and the Particular. In the article, I first describe the problem of the unconscious and Universality in Lèvi-Strauss’s <br />teaching. Subsequently, I explain how Lèvi-Strauss’ concept of the unconscious influenced Lacan’s theory. Finally, I present Hegelian aspects of Lacan’s clinical theory and ontology.</p> Grzegorz Michalik Copyright (c) 2021 Studies in the History of Philosophy Sat, 31 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Notes on Chapter XV, "Il Principe", by Niccolò Machiavelli. <p class="Standard">The article is devoted to various aspects of Machiavelli's deliberations that can be found in the 15<sup>th</sup> chapter of his famous work “Il Principe”. The first part of the article addresses the question of the legitimacy of translating the Italian “Il Principe” into the Polish term “Książę”. This issue is presented against the background of the entire history of the Polish translation of this work. The following parts of the article are devoted to the analysis of Chapter XV of “The Prince”. Focusing on this fragment of the philosopher's work is justified by the thesis that constitutes the most philosophical and, consequently, the most important part of his work. The conclusions that can be drawn from his analysis allow us to understand what were the basic assumptions of Florentine's political philosophy.</p><p class="Standard"> </p> Jakub Szczepanski Copyright (c) 2021 Studies in the History of Philosophy Fri, 16 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Neoplatońskie poszukiwania zgodności między Platonem a Arystotelesem Jan Filopon i problemy z Arystotelesowską definicją duszy ("In De anima", 203,4–230,25) <p>Fragment of the <em>Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘On the Soul’</em> written by John Philoponus, which is analysed in this paper, is an example of neoplatonic method of establishing the agreement between Plato and Aristotle. Philoponus in his looking for this agreement is inspired by peripatetic tradition and tries to show many different aspects of Aristotle’s doctrine. He is deeply influenced by peripatetic tradition, using solutions and interpretations found in works of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, and trying to answer their questions on how it is possible that definition given by Aristotle (the soul is the first act of a natural body with organs) includes all kinds of souls. John Philoponus also tries to harmonize his own reading of this particular text with the whole Aristotelian doctrine. This method seems to be in agreement with the works in which John Philoponus criticizes Aristotle’s physics from a position of a thinker who knows this theory well and is able to indicate its weakness using the same premises and notions. On the other hand, he establishes the agreement between Plato and Aristotle and interprets Aristotle’s position, so that it could be understood as expressing Plato’s thought. He achieves this by a new interpretation of notions included in the definition of the soul and showing what kind of definition it is.</p> Monika Agnieszka Komsta Copyright (c) 2021 Studies in the History of Philosophy Fri, 16 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Czy społeczeństwa śnią o sprawiedliwym pastwisku? Interpretacja "Umowy społecznej" Jana Jakuba Rousseau <p>In this paper I present an interpretation of Jean Jacques Rousseau's “Social Contract” as a normative theory of rational thinking of a political community. Using the understanding of Rousseau, suggested many times in the literature, as a theorist of group intentionality, I present the interpretation of the concept of “general will” as the intention of a group subject, which is a political community. Then I explain Rousseau’s normative remarks on democratic procedures through the prism of decision theory, in particular the relationship between the concept of general will and some concepts in game theory as well as Marquis de Condorcet’s “Jury Theorem”. I will show that the vision of fair democratic procedures proposed by Rousseau adequately reflects the conclusions drawn from the adduced theorems.</p> Maciej Tarnowski Copyright (c) 2021 Studies in the History of Philosophy Fri, 16 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Formalne warunki możliwości doświadczenia a możliwość chaosu w filozofii krytycznej Kanta <p>In Kant’s critical philosophy, the concept of chaos means a counterfactual situation in which appearances do not merge into the unity of experience according to universal laws of understanding or particular empirical laws. The possibility of complete disagreement between the appearances and the formal conditions of thinking is incompatibly with the principles of possible experience, because appearances as to the form must accord with the universal laws of understanding. The legislation of understanding, however, does not extend to the matter of appearances and the unity of nature according to empirical laws (material unity of experience) is a contingent unity in relation to our understanding. The formal conditions of possibility of experience are therefore partial conditions and do not exhaust the whole of the conditions of experience, as such, they allow for the real possibility of empirical chaos in the sense of the lack of material unity of experience. Such possibility is synonymous with the possibility of non-existence of experience, as experience is one and includes both the formal and material unity of appearances. The main thesis of this paper is that the principles of possible experience do not eliminate the contingency of our experience and are necessarily valid under the condition of the harmony of nature in the variety of its particular empirical laws with our cognitive faculty.</p> Piotr Łaciak Copyright (c) 2021 Studies in the History of Philosophy Fri, 16 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0200 O pojęciu i przedmiocie <p class="western" align="left">Autorzy przekładu:</p><p class="western" align="left">Patryk Popławski,, </p><p class="western" align="left">,</p><p class="western" align="left">Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu</p><p class="western" align="left">Rafał Michalski,,</p><p class="western" align="left"></p><p class="western" align="left">Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu</p> Gottlob Frege Copyright (c) 2021 Studies in the History of Philosophy Fri, 16 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0200