Dual Sense of Kantian Way of Conceiving of Aesthetical Values

Abstract

This article draws attention to the difference between empirical and logical cognition that occurs in Kant's philosophy. First of all, we want to show how the concept of aesthetics evolved in Kant’s philosophy. Although it might seem that the Königsberg philosopher’s concept of aesthetics from the Critique of Pure Reason is diametrically different from that which occurs in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, we want to argue here that in reality these two ways of thinking about aesthetics are related. For this purpose, it is important to indicate the fact that sense experience is also a kind of cognition, different from the scientific, objective or mathematical one; nevertheless, it is a cognitive element of the world and, what is more, it exists earlier that the scientific cognition. In this context it is easier to understand Kant's considerations about the universality of some aesthetic judgments. This part of the article closes with an attempt to show why the German philosopher does not want to give colors the same status as the form in a work of art. In order to make the audience aware of the importance of these two types of cognition in Kant's aesthetics, we also look at some examples from the analysis of the sublime.

            The aim of the article is not to discover any unknown, new connections between concepts that are present in Kant’s philosophy, but rather to show the Polish reader how clearly the connections between these concepts are present in all Critiques, and that when considering one category, one should always remember about a holistic view.