Das Problem der „Dinge an sich selbst“ bei Kant im Lichte einer sprachanalytischen Rekonstruktion

Abstract

The Problem of the “Thing-in-Itself” in Immanuel Kant’s Philosophy from the Linguistic Analysis Perspective

The paper deals with the problem of the “thing in itself” in Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy from the perspective of linguistic analysis. The consideration is conducted with regard to Gerold Prauss’s work Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the coherence of the Dinge an sich selbst betrachtet concept in its twofold meaning: (1) transcendental-philosophical, that is argumentatively properly justified within the frame of Kant’s Theory of Experience, and (2) as a transcendental-metaphysical (non)sense that critics have been focused on since the beginnings of reception of Kant’s Philosophy. Such a transcendent-metaphysical (non)sense is understood as an argument in favour of an inconsistency in Kant’s thought. Prauss argues, that the non(sense) mentioned above occurs always when Kant – having in mind the methodological distinction of a “thing as a phenomenon” and on the other hand the “thing-in-itself” established within the frame of his own transcendental-philosophical concept – does not consistently observe the implication that results from his own fundamental distinction. It means that Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason had himself contributed to the confusing interpretation of the “thing in itself”.