Tło filozoficzne teorii percepcji Thomasa Reida

Abstract

The subject of this article is not explicity the theory of perception that Reid propounded. To present it would go beyond his modest framework because an essential part of Reid's view was the so-called common sense principles. The nature, number and cognition role of these principles would require a separate discussion. In this text, therefore, I concentrate on the specific preliminaries of the philosophy proposed by the founder of the Scottish school of common sense, which can be interpreted as a "negative reference point", which is the starting point for "positive" solutions, i.e. Reid's proposed theory of perception. He thus began with a critique of the "theory of ideas", which, in Reid's view, was the main reason for the failure to formulate a satisfactory philosophy of mind. Within this critique, we find his reflections on the method of philosophising itself, the differences that occur in the study of such different objects as material objects and cognitive mind, and his interpretation of the consequences of the adaption of the theory of ideas by the philosophers of modernity. The result of Reid's theoretical analyses is the rejection of the assumption of any mutual interaction between matter and mind, the questioning of the possibility of perception of material objects based on similarity of sense impressions and the things perceived, and the accusation of the proponents of this theory of dooming philosophy to idealism and scepticism.