Moral Evil as a “Thick” Ethical Concept
Keywordsmoral evil, thin ethical concepts, thick ethical concepts
The paper aims to propose a framework for understanding of the concept of moral evil. It argues that “evil” should be considered one of the so-called “thick” ethical concepts, characterized by their ability to be simultaneously descriptive and normative. To that effect, it examines the relationship between the concepts of moral wrongness and the idea of evil, with a view to explaining why moral evil should be understood as a “thick” rather than a “thin” ethical concept. Finally, it offers some reasons for cultivating thick ethical concepts, and suggests the conditions which have to be met if a thick concept of evil is to be helpful rather than harmful.
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