La question métaphysique de l’identité d’un point de vue aristotélicien : L’hylémorphisme (d’Aristote), l’ADN (de Berti) et l’essence (de Lowe)
Keywords
form, essence, hylemorphism, Lowe, BertiAbstract
(The Metaphysical Question of Identity from an Aristotelian Point of View: Aristotle´s Hylemorphism, Berti´s DNA and Lowe´s Essentialism)
Can we reify the form of a substance? Is it possible to identify DNA as the principle of our personal and numerical identity? These questions will be studied through Berti’s reading of Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Indeed, Enrico Berti proposes the identification of the DNA to the Aristotelian notion of form, thesis which raises many questions from an exegetical point of view and a metaphysical perspective. We will present the sources of Berti’s reading and one of the main objections made by Aristotle. Thus, different versions of the Berti’s thesis will be examined and then, a thought experiment that makes them false. Finally, it will be proposed an aristotelian solution, coming from a contemporary Aristotelian (E. J. Lowe), that seems to prevent Berti’s mistakes and gives us a robust metaphysics of the identity.
References
Aristote. 1991. Métaphysique, T 1, Livres A–Z. Traduction par Jules Tricot. Paris : Vrin.
Aristotelis. 1957. Metaphysica. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
Berti, Enrico. 2008. « La notion de la forme individuelle comme condition de l’identité changeante ». In L’identité changeante de l’individu, édité par E. D. Carosella et alii, 213-220.
Carosella E. D., Saint-Sernin B., Capelle P., Sánchez Sorondo S. E. M. 2008. L’identité changeante de l’individu, La constante construction du Soi. Paris : L’Harmattan.
Garcia, Emanuelle & Nef, Frédéric. 2008. Métaphysique contemporaine, Propriétés, mondes possibles et personnes. Paris : Vrin.
Nussbaum, Martha C. & Putnam, Hilary. 1992, « Changing Aristotle’s Mind ». In, Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, édité par A. O. Rorty et M. Nussbaum. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 25-56.
Lowe, Edward J. 2007. « La métaphysique comme science de l’essence ». In Métaphysique contemporaine, Propriétés, mondes possibles et personnes, édité par E. Garcia et F. Nef. Paris : Vrin, 85-117.
Lowe, Edward J. 2008. Personal Agency, The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
Putnam, Hilary & Conant James. 1994. Words and Life. Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press.
Shields, Christopher. 2014. Aristotle. Londres-New York : Routledge.
Simons, Peter. 2004. « Pourquoi presque tout – mais non pas exactement toute chose – est une entité ». In La structure du monde, objets, propriétés, états de choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans l’école australienne de philosophie, édité par Jean-Maurice Monnoyer. Paris : Vrin.
Varzi, Achille C. 2010. Ontologie. Paris : Editions d’Ithaque.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
CC BY ND 4.0. The Creator/Contributor is the Licensor, who grants the Licensee a non-exclusive license to use the Work on the fields indicated in the License Agreement.
- The Licensor grants the Licensee a non-exclusive license to use the Work/related rights item specified in § 1 within the following fields: a) recording of Work/related rights item; b) reproduction (multiplication) of Work/related rights item in print and digital technology (e-book, audiobook); c) placing the copies of the multiplied Work/related rights item on the market; d) entering the Work/related rights item to computer memory; e) distribution of the work in electronic version in the open access form on the basis of Creative Commons license (CC BY-ND 3.0) via the digital platform of the Nicolaus Copernicus University Press and file repository of the Nicolaus Copernicus University.
- Usage of the recorded Work by the Licensee within the above fields is not restricted by time, numbers or territory.
- The Licensor grants the license for the Work/related rights item to the Licensee free of charge and for an unspecified period of time.
FULL TEXT License Agreement
Stats
Number of views and downloads: 830
Number of citations: 0