Rosyjskie prywatne przedsiębiorstwa zbrojne jako czynnik potęgujący strategiczną niejednoznaczność i wspierający działania o charakterze zwodniczym
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/TIS.2025.004Słowa kluczowe
prywatne przedsiębiorstwa wojskowe (PMCs), Grupa Wagnera, wojna hybrydowa, strategiczna manipulacja, strategiczna niejednoznaczność, działania zwodnicze, dezinformacjaAbstrakt
Rosyjskie prywatne przedsiębiorstwa wojskowe (PMCs) - niebędące w swej istocie ani przedsiębiorstwami, ani podmiotami prywatnymi - stały się dla Kremla istotnym instrumentem wywierania wpływu w wymiarze strategicznym. Oprócz ich działań typowo wojskowych, zademonstrowanych w szczególności podczas wojny w Ukrainie, wysyłanie ich za granicę potęguje stragiczną niejednoznaczność oraz umożliwia prowadzenie operacji o charakterze zwodniczym zgodnie z celami polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Rosji. Wytłumaczenie znaczenia tego rodzaju oddziaływania stanowi główny problem badawczy niniejszego artykułu. W tym celu zastosowano siedmioelementowy model analityczny Roberta Mandela dotyczący manipulacji w wymiarze strategicznym. Pozwala to na ukazanie tych elementów specyfiki rosyjskich PMCs, które umożliwiają tego rodzaju działania, jak również na zaprezentowanie realizowanych w ten sposób celów strategicznych oraz ocenę skuteczności rzeczonego podejścia. Ujęcie zastosowane w ramach artykułu, w przeciwieństwie do większości publikacji poświęconych tego rodzaju podmiotom, umożliwia interpretację wykorzystania PMCs przez Rosję nie przez pryzmat siły militarnej, ale oddziaływania psychologicznego na innych, zarówno bezpośrednio (przez prowadzenie operacji informacyjnych i psychologicznych), jak również pośrednio (przez kształtowanie postrzegania Federacji Rosyjskiej na arenie międzynarodowej). Jak zostało to ukazane, ostatni z przywołanych aspektów można uznać za kluczowy, jako że Rosja zyskuje w ten sposób użyteczne narzędzie służące m.in. zwiększaniu poczucia zagrożenia w określonych państwach czy regionach przez wywieranie polityczno-militarnej presji "poniżej progu wojny", a także zapewnieniu stosunkowo tanim kosztem zdolności do projekcji siły (choć nie zawsze skutecznych).
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