Inadequacy of Experience and the Possibility of Chaos in Husserl’s Phenomenology

Abstract

The main thesis of the text is that the possibility of total empirical chaos, which is considered as part of the experiment of the annihilation of the world, is not a real possibility, but a logical possibility. According to Husserl, the hypothesis of total empirical chaos is connected with the fundamental inadequacy of the experience of the world, which does not exclude the possibility of the non-existence of the world. The annihilation of the world as a result of the total collapse of the experience of the world, however, I can only accept hypothetically and such a fictional possibility is not a real possibility, because the absolute fact of my experience precedes all possibilities, giving them only the meaning of real possibilities. Experience in its original structure includes both the experience of the world and the experience of the ego cogito, and is one absolute experience, so that the possibility of global empirical chaos turns out to be merely an empty thought experiment, and as such this possibility remains in a fundamental analogy to the possibility of unknowable things in themselves.

Keywords: transcendental phenomenology, experiment of the annihilation of the world, experience of the world, experience of the ego cogito, real possibility, logical possibility