Future War: The Russian Perspective
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2021.012Keywords
Russian Federation, military technology, conflict, future wa, security,Abstract
In a multipolar world, military security issues still occupy a key place in the public debate. Military technology is one of the most developing sectors in the world. There is no doubt that the United States and the People’s Republic of China have dominated this sector in recent years. The Russian defense industry is associated with outdated equipment, technology and corruption. Nevertheless, recent conflicts show that the Russian Federation has mastered the elements of information war. “New war” theory was advanced by Mary Kaldor to characterize warfare in the post-Cold War era. According to newest research, nowadays military conflicts employ some elements of both conventional and cybernetic combat, while military operations are supported by domestic and international propaganda. The main goal of this article is to determine what type of conflict is contemporary Russia preparing for and in what ways.
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