Sensationism and the Problem of Perceptual Content. The Case of Condillac

Abstract

Sensationism and the Problem of Perceptual Content. Condillac’s Casus The aim of this article is to consider possible problems that might occur while connecting three problems of sensationism: a) source of sense knowledge; b) perceptual processes; c) real and empirical correlate of our knowledge. The juxtaposition of these three elements in Condillac’s thought leads to posing a question about the nature of perceptual content given in perception. The author of the thesis claims that Condillac’s standpoint – in spite of his declarations – contains certain proto-conceptual activity which functions simultaneously to our ability to experience sensations. The consequence of this ascertainment is that Condillac’s radical sensationism – in the version which is often presented – is very hard to defend. According to the author, Condillac may be considered one of the sources of Kant’s thought and implied as a source of the contemporary, analytic philosophy of perception.