Generalna teza nastawienia naturalnego jako uniwersalny przed-sąd

Próba interpretacji hermeneutycznej

Abstrakt

According to Husserl, the general thesis of the natural attitude can be defined as a prejudice, which constitutes the pre-theoretical assumption of all knowledge. In reference to the general thesis, Husserl returns to the literal meaning of the concept of “prejudice” (Vorurteil) as a “pre-judgment” (Vor-Urteil), which precedes all judgments in the form of universal anticipation. From this perspective, Husserl’s phenomenology aims to recognize this universal pre-judgment as non-thematic, presumptive anticipation. In order to explain the anticipatory nature of the general thesis, we must suspend it by carrying out a phenomenological reduction, which consists in reflective disclosure of the thesis as a constitutive achievement of consciousness. The aim of the article is to demonstrate that universal anticipation, which is grounded in the pre-judgmental character of the general thesis and is indicated in German expressions with the prefix “vor-”, such as: “Vorgriff ”, “Vorwissen”, “Vorbekanntheit”, “Vorgegebenheit”, predetermines the character of all experience and is raised to the dignity of a priori knowledge.