The “due process” of constitutional revision: which guidance from Europe?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/TSP-W.2021.011Słowa kluczowe
nowelizacja konstytucji, Komisja Wenecka, Rada Europy, skuteczna i zgodna z prawem procedura zmiany konstytucjiAbstrakt
Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy wpływu wywieranego przez Radę Europy, zwłaszcza przez Komisję Wenecką, oraz Unię Europejską na procedury zmiany konstytucji, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Włoch, państwa założycielskiego obu organizacji. We wstępie omówiono problematykę trudnej równowagi między sztywnością a elastycznością demokratycznych konstytucji, dobrze zilustrowaną przez debatę akademicką oraz Raport Komisji Weneckiej w sprawie poprawek konstytucyjnych z 2010 r. (CDL-AD(2010)001). W artykule rozważono także, jakie standardy europejskie zostały ustanowione, zwłaszcza przez Komisję Wenecką, w celu zaprojektowania skutecznej i zgodnej z prawem procedury zmiany konstytucji oraz czy włoskie przepisy konstytucyjne i praktyka dostosowały się do nich. Ponadto rozważono wpływ uczestnictwa Włoch w Radzie Europy i Unii Europejskiej na treść poprawek przyjętych do włoskiej konstytucji. Argumentuje się, że co najmniej od połowy XX w. procedury poprawek konstytucyjnych nie mogą być już traktowane jako zjawiska czysto narodowe. W coraz większym stopniu kierują się one standardami ustalonymi na poziomie ponadnarodowym, zwłaszcza przez Komisję Wenecką, wynikającymi z europejskiego wspólnego dziedzictwa konstytucyjnego. Wpływ ten wywierany jest zarówno na płaszczyźnie proceduralnej, określającej to, co można nazwać „należytym procesem” rewizji konstytucyjnej, jak i na płaszczyźnie bardziej merytorycznej.
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