THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SHADOW OF A GUN: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL VIEWS ON MYANMAR’S COUP D’ÉTAT

Abstract

The Tatmadaw’s military takeover in Myanmar on the 1st of February has marked a significant step back in the country’s path towards democracy. Several doubts are raised as to why the military has decided to dismiss the institutional changes that it agreed to grant the country after the Saffron Revolution of 2007 in the first place. This paper seeks to examine the current military takeover in Myanmar through the lenses of its complex post-colonial history, marked by the continuous evolution of various intra-state stakeholder’s interactions, such as the Sangha, the Tatmadaw and the students. Subsequent to the historical analysis, we provide a legal outlook combing through the salient constitutional provision on the division of powers, aiming to understand if the balance thereof has been seen as an existential threat undermining the military’s hegemonic position over time. Finally, we aim to offer an account on why western expectations regarding Aung San Suu Kyi as a representative of Western liberal democracy could not be factually met. We conclude that the 2007 constitution institutionalized a political system that allowed wiggle room for non-military stakeholders to obtain further democratic concessions, that could result in a significant threat to the Tatmadaw’s rule. Such approach sheds outlook on the causes of the coup d’état and allows projections for the near future.