Shapeability – Aristotelian Affectivity and the Missing Dimension of Being in Heidegger

Abstract

Heidegger’s ontology, uncovering the multidimensionality of the phenomenon of being, seems to overlook an essential dimension of it. This gap pertains to the omission of the mutual affecting of beings, which leaves traces in beings. In identifying it, I draw upon Aristotle’s concept of affecting/being affected (On Generation and Corruption, Book I), which seeks to explain the origin of alteration in beings. Referring to the Aristotelian juxtaposition of action-passion serves, however, to illustrate the above omission and is an inspiration to explore the possibility of incorporating the concept of ‘shapeability’ into the framework of Heidegger’s ontology. This dimension of being’s disclosure, located at the junction of timeliness and worldliness, will be related to shaping and being shaped by other beings. I shall show how being, understood as revealing a given being’s specificity, can be disclosed in changes resulting from the inevitable mutual changing of beings.