Beyond Scylla and Charybdis. The Problem of Fallibilist Interpretations of Xenophanes’ Thought
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/RF.2017.036Keywords
Fallibilism, Xenophanes, skepticism, epistemology, knowledgeAbstract
In this article, I examine extant fragments of works by Xenophanes from the perspective of fallibilist interpretations. I begin with a general description of the fallibilist position and specify how fallibilism may be understood. To this end, I analyze select definitions of fallibilism with special attention paid to Susan Haack’s research on this doctrine. A distinction between positive and negative fallibilism is also introduced. The main aim of the article is to analyze key epistemological fragments by Xenophanes in the context of a possible fallibilist interpretation, from the perspective of both, positive and negative forms of fallibilism distinguished earlier. I will also present arguments for interpreting his philosophy in the spirit of anti-fallibilism. Finally, I will try to show that Xenophanes’ views, to a greater degree than the later Carneades views, are apt to be recognized as the historical source of positive fallibilism.
References
Attfield R., Popper and Xenophanes, “Philosophy” 2014, vol. 89, s. 113-133.
Austin S., Scepticism and Dogmatism in the Presocratics, „Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science” 2000, vol. 33, s. 239-246.
Bryan J., Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato, Cambridge Classical Studies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York 2012.
Calasso R., Zaślubiny Kadmosa z Harmonią, przeł. S. Kasprzysiak, Znak, Kraków 1995.
Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und Deutch von H. Diels, hrsg. von W. Kranz, Bd. 1–3, Zürich 1985.
Farenga V., Open and speak your mind, w: Probabilities, Hypotheticals, and Counterfactuals in Ancient Greek Thought, V. Wohl (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, s. 84-100.
Haack S., Theories of Knowledge: An Analytic Framework, “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series” 1982-1983, vol. 83, s. 143-157.
Hanuszewicz S., Znaczenie fallibilizmu, http://zbc.uz.zgora.pl/Content/3012/ fallibilizm_calosc.pdf, data wejścia: 29.12.2017.
Havelock E. A., Parmenides and Odysseus, „Harvard Studies in Classical Philology” 1958, vol. 63, s. 133–143.
Heitsch E., Das Wissen des Xenophanes, „Rheinisches Museum für Philologie – Neue Folge” 1966, Bd. 109, pp. 193–235.
Hezjod, Narodziny bogów (Theogonia), Prace i dni, Tarcza, przeł. J. Łanowski, Warszawa 1999.
Homer, Odyseja, przeł. i oprac. J. Parandowski, Warszawa 1998.
Kirk G. S., Popper on Science and the Presocratics, „Mind” 1960, vol. 69, s. 318-339.
Kubok D., Comments on the Sources of Greek Philosophical Criticism, w: “Folia Philosophica” 34. Special issue: Forms of Criticism in Philosophy and Science, ed. by D. Kubok, Katowice 2015, s. 9-31.
Kubok D., Conversation and Conservation. Two Kinds of Anti-Dogmatic Criticism in the Philosophy of Politics and their Antecedents in Ancient Greek Forms of Skepticism and Fallibilism, w: D. Kubok (ed.), Thinking Critically: What Does It Mean? The Tradition of Philosophical Criticism and Its Forms in the European History of Ideas, De Gruyter, Berlin, Boston 2018, s. 73-92.
Kubok D., Ksenofanes z Kolofonu i greckie źródła problemu poznania, „Analiza i Egzystencja” 2013, nr 23, s. 5–23.
Kubok D., Postęp, pycha, pokora: Ksenofanes z Kolofonu a Hezjod, „Folia Philosophica” 2014, nr 32, s. 215-231.
Kubok D., Xenophanes of Colophon and the problem of distinguishing between scepticism and negative dogmatism, “Electryone” 2016, vol. 4, iss. 2, s. 31-53.
Lacey A. R., Słownik filozoficzny, przeł. R. Matuszewski, Zysk i sp., Poznań: 1999.
Lesher J. H., Xenophanes on Inquiry and Discovery: An Alternative to the ‘Hymn to Progress.’ Reading of Fr. 18, “Ancient Philosophy” 1991, vol. 11, s. 229–248.
Lesher J. H., Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments. A Text and Translation with a Commentary by J. H. Lesher, Toronto 1992.
Lesher J. H., Xenophanes’ Scepticism, „Phronesis” 1978, vol. 23, s. 1-21.
Lloyd G. E. R., Popper versus Kirk: A Controversy in the Interpretation of Greek Science, „British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 1967, vol. 18, s. 21-38.
Loenen J. H. M. M., In Defence of the Traditional Interpretation of Xenophanes Frag. 18, “Mnemosyne” 1956, vol. 9, s. 135–136.
Marcinkowska M., Ksenofanes z Kolofonu o ludzkim poznaniu, „Studia Antyczne i Mediewistyczne” 2004, nr 2 [37], s. 3-25.
McDermid D., The Gospel of Uncertainty: Popper's Radical Fallibilism Re-Examined, “Grazer Philosophische Studien” 2012, vol. 86, s. 117-136.
Mourelatos A. P. D., The Route of Parmenides, Yale University Press, New Haven I London 1970.
Popper K. R., The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightment, London-New York 1998.
Philippoussis J., The Gnoseological and Metaphysical Particularity of Xenophanes’ Thought, w: Boudouris K. J. (ed.), Ionian Philosophy, Athens 1989, s. 327–336.
Reed B., How to Think about Fallibilism, “Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition” 2002, vol. 107, no. 2, 143-157.
Rescher N., Fallibilism, w: The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (ed.), vol. I-X, : Routledge, London-New York 1998.
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos, w: Sexti Empirici Opera. Rec. H. Mutschmann. II Adversus dogmaticos libros quinque (Adv. Math. VII-XI) continens. Lipsiae, in Aedibus B. G. Teubneri 1914; III Adversus mathematicos libros I-VI continens, ed. J. Mau, Lipsiae, in Aedibus B. G. Teubneri 1961.
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, R. G. Bury (trans.), Prometheus Books, Buffalo 1990.
Shorey P., Note on Xenophanes Fr. 18 (Diels) and Isocrates Panegyricus 32, „Classical Philology” 1911, vol. 6, no. 1, s. 88-89.
Śpiewak S., The Homeric Source of the Category of δόξα. Δοκέω from a Cognitive-Presumptive Perspective: A Presumption on the Present, w: “Folia Philosophica” 34. Special issue: Forms of Criticism in Philosophy and Science, ed. by D. Kubok, Katowice 2015, s. 33-60.
Tulin A., Xenophanes Fr. 18 D.-K. and the Origins of the Idea of Progress, “Hermes” 1993, vol. 121, s. 129–138.
Verdenius W. J., Xenophanes Frag. 18, “Mnemosyne” 1955, vol. 8, s. 221.
Weintraub R., Fallibilism and Rational Belief, “The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science” 1993, vol. 44, iss. 2, s. 251-261.
Ziemińska R., Historia sceptycyzmu, Toruń 2013.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
Stats
Number of views and downloads: 489
Number of citations: 0