Is the integration of the philosophical perspective and the scientific views possible? The post-Wittgensteinian need for theoretical re-formulations

Abstract

If we agree that there is a visible tension between various personal experiences and the way in which science treats them, we can also assume that we would like to find a perspective which would link what is first-personally individual with scientific methods and the results of research. If we additionally consent to the claim that vital changes are needed to the mode in which we describe and analyse the human subject, as philosophers we have to face the following question: What is the role of philosophy in looking for a common methodology capable of uniting both human personal experience and scientific descriptions? I am going to sketch the theoretical background which has to be embedded in philosophy if we want to put it in a comprehensible form. I argue that following some Wittgensteinian hints and traces from the contemporary embodied theories of knowing subjects in the cognitive science we could construct the intellectual area in which we can reflect upon and re-formulate the assumptions we usually tacitly take for granted while thinking about the shape of science and tasks of philosophy.