Problem of the Totality of Reality in Kant’s Philosophy

Abstract

Problem of the Totality of Reality in Kant’s Philosophy.

In this article I present the problem of the totality of reality in Kant's philosophy and, in connection with it, the different understandings of the world that appear in this concept: traditional (dogmatic), empirical and transcendental (proper). The classical concept of the world is subjected to criticism and rejected as a type of "thing-in-itself"; the empirical concept, in turn, refers to a certain narrow, private world surrounding the subject and is insufficient, and the transcendental, proper and adequate concept of the world ("idea of ​​the world") is developed only at the level of reason. The main interpretative axis of the publication is the thesis that since in Kant's theory we have no access to the world outside of knowledge, and the only world given to us is the world represented in knowledge-about-the-world, the philosophical path to understanding the world must lead through knowledge.