George Berkeley as a Neoplatonist? Common Grounds in Early and Late Philosophy of Berkeley

Abstract

Sometimes the late period of Berkeley's philosophy related to the publication of Siris is interpreted as a renouncement of the early period’s theses. In the literature on the subject, however, there are references to the complementarity of Berkeley's writings from different years. This article is an attempt to look at Berkeley's philosophical system from both periods of his philosophical activity in terms of its basic metaphysical assumptions. The Neoplatonic interpretive key used for this task allows one to look at some of its elements from a different perspective, e.g. to draw attention to metaphysical gradualism as the core of the Irish philosopher's system. In this view, Berkeley becomes above all a religiously engaged metaphysician, for whom epistemological reflection is only a complement to a philosophical project.  Berkeley's references in Siris to the Neoplatonic tradition do not serve a persuasive function (as some commentators postulate) but express the authentic sense of his philosophy. The contrast between the early Berkeley system (empiricism) and the late one (Neoplatonism) in this interpretation turns out to be unfounded because epistemological claims are justified by a certain, Neoplatonism-related vision of reality. Thus, the subjectivist approach to time and space does not appear only as an epistemological postulate, developed based on discussions with 17^th-century philosophy, but as a metaphysical theorem, central to the Good Bishop’s system.

Keywords: George Berkeley, Neoplatonism, idealism, metaphysical gradualism, time, space