Heidegger and the Ontological Status of Nothing
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/33064Keywords
Heidegger, Being, nothing, vulnerability, guiltAbstract
This paper examines Heidegger’s thoughts on vulnerability by focusing on his conception of Dasein as fundamentally guilty and constituted by a lack. The argument put forth is that this guilt and lack condition the possibility of Dasein as a being who interprets both itself and Being. Such interpretations showcase Dasein as a being of primordial impotency and highlight the necessity of nothing, and nothing’s positive “ontological status,” as constitutive of such impotency, guilt, and lack.
References
Duane Armitage. 2016. Heidegger’s Pauline and Lutheran Roots. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Critchley Simon. 2012. The Faith of the Faithless. London: Verso Press.
Heidegger Martin. 1993. Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers.
Heidegger Martin. 1962. Being and Time, transl. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row.
Heidegger Martin. 1979. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
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