The epistemological aspect of self- knowledge in the light of psychological externalism
Słowa kluczoweself-knowledge, externalism, content, self-consciousness, psychology, cognition
This paper addresses the issue of reconciling self-knowledge based on first-person authority with externalism. We will argue that the externalist standpoint, and particularly that of psychological externalism, is the correct one; not only because it advances the thesis about the external determinants of mental content on which the justification of the content depends, but primarily because it offers a positive argument for solving the problem of self-knowledge by stating that the external environment not only determines the content of the subject’s mental states, but is also necessary for self-knowledge.
Fodor, J.A., The Elm and The Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics, MIT, 1994.
Frege, G., Sense and Reference, “The Philosophical Review”, vol. 57, Issue 3 (1948), pp. 209-230.
Gibson, J.J., The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979.
Gibson, J.J., The Theory of Affordances, in: R. Shaw & J. Bransford (eds.). “Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing: Toward an Ecological Psychology”, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1977.
Goldberg, S.C., “The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge”, Synthese 118, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1999.
Guttenplan, S., First Person Authority, in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) “A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind”, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., Olsson, A., Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task, “Science” 310, 2005, pp. 116–119.
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., From change blindness to choice blindness, “Psychologia”, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2008,, pp. 142-155.
Peacocke, Ch, Being Known, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.
Peacocke, Ch., Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I), In: “Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind”, J. Cohen, B. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell 2006, http://www.columbia.edu/~cp2161/Online_Papers/.
Putnam, H., The Meaning of ‘Meaning’, “Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science” 7, 1975, pp. 131–193.
Putnam, H., Brains in a vat, in: “Reason, Truth, and History”, Cambridge-New York-Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1981,
Rensink, R.A., On the applications of change blindness, “Psychologia”, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2008, pp. 100-106.
Schwitzgebel, E., Belief, “The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy” (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/belief/
Wright, C., Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention, “Journal of Philosophy”, 89 (1989), pp. 622–34.
Liczba wyświetleń i pobrań: 151
Liczba cytowań: 0