Chance and Risk - on the Slippery Slope Argument in Bioethics

Abstract

The article aims to outline the overall structure and to present examples and elements of the criticism of applying "slippery slope" arguments in bioethical discussion. Numerous variations of arguments of "slippery slope" theory are very prevalent in today's debate on bioethical issues, but their opponents are trying to prove that they are not logically correct and that they are functioning only as an element of the art of rhetoric. I would like to present selected typologies and ask a question about the criteria that have to be fulfilled in order for us to determine whether or not "slippery slope" arguments should be considered important and binding to particular discussions. I am drawing attention particularly to the typology of Bernard Williams and his solution on the separation of similar cases, the typical mistaken application of the argument and also mentioning arguments similar to the "slippery slope" theory in terms of structure, using the division made by Frederick Schauer. My belief is that a closer look at this popular form of argumentation may be useful in estimating the risk of specific considerations in realm of law and biopolitics.