Detection of collusion in an industry with application of wavelet analysis – theoretical model
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/AUNC_ECON.2010.001Keywords
explicit and tacit collusion, supergames, cartel detection, Lysine, price variance, wavelet analysisAbstract
In this paper a supergame model of collusion based on fixed cartel quota exogenously provided by cartel members’ agreement is developed. The model provides theoretical motivation of price wars and variance screen of collusion. We use the model to explain behavior of well known Lysine conspiracy members. In a second part of a research we will verify usefulness of a variance marker in an empirical example with application of wavelet analysis.
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