Normativity: the Hard Problem

Josefa Toribio

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/ths.2008.002

Abstract


My goal in the present paper is to use Haugeland’s treatment as a springboard to explore a key problem for biological accounts of semantic properties, namely, how to capture the distinction between malfunction and misrepresentation. While Haugeland generates a complex taxonomy of species and subspecies of rules to support his arguments against the risks of identifying social propriety and objective correctness, he is rather more austere in his analysis of the naturalistic problem. I shall sketch a somewhat richer landscape, in which the space of error- by-misrepresentation (as opposed to malfunction) is itself split into two

Keywords


normativity; semantic behaviour; cognitive studies; semantics; John Haugeland

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References


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