Towards a Critical Philosphy of Science

Richard F. Kitchener



Up until fairly recently, and still continuing in many quarters, the received view about the philosophy of science was one rooted in the Vienna Circle/Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism  . In fact, it is something of a commonplace to point out that logical positivism both established the philosophy of science as a professional specialty (with its own disciplinary identity) and in so doing left an indelible philosophical mark upon it. Indeed, as Suppes points out , although logical positivism was widely rejected as a general epistemology, many continued to see it as adaquate philosophy of science. Logical positivism may have died as a general epistemological or philosophical movement, therefore, but it was merely transformed into philosophy of science.


science; philosphy

Full Text:



Some positions from the references:

Brodbeck M., The Nature and Function of the Philosophy of Science, [in:] Readings in the Philosophy of Science, H. Feigl & M. Brodbeck, eds. (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1953), p. 5.

Carnap R., The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language, [in:] Logical Positivism, A. J. Ayer, ed. (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), pp. 60—61. This article originally appeared in 1932.

Carnap R., The Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Univer¬sity of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 5—7.

Hempel C., (Aspects of Scientific Explanation, [in:] Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science [New York]: Free Press, 1965], pp. 412—415)

Kitchener R., Developmental Explanations, Review of Metaphysics, 36 (1983), pp. 791—818; Is Genetic Epistemology Possible?, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 38 (1987), pp. 238—299

Merton R., The Sociology of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1973).

Niddith P.H., Introduction, [in:] The Philosophy of Science. P. H. Niddith, ed. (Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 5.

Piaget’s Theory of Knowledge: Genetic Epistemolo¬gy and Scientific Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).


  • There are currently no refbacks.

ISSN 2392-1196 (online)

Partnerzy platformy czasopism