Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth

Savas L. Tsohatzidis

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2013.025

Abstract


This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence’s meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.

Keywords


self-reference; truth-theories; meaning-theories; compositionality; natural language semantics

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References


[Kaplan, 1989] Kaplan, D., “Demonstratives”, pages 481–564 in: J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.

[Soames, 2010] Soames, S., What is Meaning?, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010.

[Yablo, 1993] Yablo, S., “Paradox without self-reference”, Analysis, 53 (1993): 251-252. DOI: 10.2307/3328245








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ISSN: 1425-3305 (print version)
ISSN: 2300-9802 (electronic version)

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