Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth

Savas L. Tsohatzidis



This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence’s meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.


self-reference; truth-theories; meaning-theories; compositionality; natural language semantics

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ISSN: 1425-3305 (print version)

ISSN: 2300-9802 (electronic version)

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