Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2013.025Słowa kluczowe
self-reference, truth-theories, meaning-theories, compositionality, natural language semanticsAbstrakt
This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence’s meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.Bibliografia
[Kaplan, 1989] Kaplan, D., “Demonstratives”, pages 481–564 in: J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
[Soames, 2010] Soames, S., What is Meaning?, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010.
[Yablo, 1993] Yablo, S., “Paradox without self-reference”, Analysis, 53 (1993): 251-252. DOI: 10.2307/3328245
Pobrania
Opublikowane
03.09.2013
Jak cytować
1.
TSOHATZIDIS, Savas L. Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth. Logic and Logical Philosophy [online]. 3 wrzesień 2013, T. 22, nr 4, s. 445–452. [udostępniono 4.7.2024]. DOI 10.12775/LLP.2013.025.
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