G.E. Moore on logical possibility

Tadeusz Czarnecki

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2002.001

Abstract


Aristotle interprets modalities in a manner consistent with common sense. Necessity, possibility and contingency are modes in which sentences are related to their properties of being true or false. Accordingly, modal sentences concern the actual world. As a sentence becomes true in virtue of its relation to the world, the sentence should firstly be materially true if one is to determine whether it is necessarily or contingently true. A sentence is true if it describes as existing what actually exists and simply cannot be true if its content does not refer to the actual world.

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References


Konyndyk, K. (1986). Introductory Modal Logic, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, pp. 12–14.

Plantinga, A.(1974). The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Chihara, C. (1998). The Worlds of Possibility, Oxford: Clarendon Press.




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Financed by MNiSW on the basis of agreement no. 706/P-DUN/2018 (dated 10/05/18). Project 1: “Preparation of articles in English for eight editions of the journal Logic and Logical Philosophy over the period 2018–19; Vol. 27, No. 1–4 (2018), Vol. 28, No. 1–4 (2019)”; amount from the DUN grant: 64800 zł. Project 4: “Digitalisation of eight editions of the journal Logic and Logical Philosophy over the period 2018-19; Vol. 27, No. 1–4 (2018), Vol. 28, No. 1–4 (2019)”; amount from the DUN grant: 18600 zł.


ISSN: 1425-3305 (print version)
ISSN: 2300-9802 (electronic version)

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