G.E. Moore on logical possibility
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2002.001Abstrakt
Aristotle interprets modalities in a manner consistent with common sense. Necessity, possibility and contingency are modes in which sentences are related to their properties of being true or false. Accordingly, modal sentences concern the actual world. As a sentence becomes true in virtue of its relation to the world, the sentence should firstly be materially true if one is to determine whether it is necessarily or contingently true. A sentence is true if it describes as existing what actually exists and simply cannot be true if its content does not refer to the actual world.Bibliografia
Konyndyk, K. (1986). Introductory Modal Logic, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, pp. 12–14.
Plantinga, A.(1974). The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Chihara, C. (1998). The Worlds of Possibility, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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Opublikowane
19.01.2004
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1.
CZARNECKI, Tadeusz. G.E. Moore on logical possibility. Logic and Logical Philosophy [online]. 19 styczeń 2004, T. 10, nr 10, s. 7–19. [udostępniono 25.7.2024]. DOI 10.12775/LLP.2002.001.
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