Was Tarski a deflationist?

Richard Schantz

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.1998.008


The article explores the relationship between Tarski’s theory of truth and modern deflationary or minimalist accounts of truth. The author notes many similarites, but he also identifies an important difference between Tarski’s theory and the various approaches of his modern followers: Tarski thought of his theory of truth as an elaboration of the classical correspondence notion. The heart of his theory is the definition of truth in terms of satisfaction. Truth is explicated in terms of a relation between language and aspects of external reality. It is just this central component of his theory which is rejected by modern deflationism and minimalism.

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Financed by MNiSW on the basis of agreement no. 706/P-DUN/2018 (dated 10/05/18). Project 1: “Preparation of articles in English for eight editions of the journal Logic and Logical Philosophy over the period 2018–19; Vol. 27, No. 1–4 (2018), Vol. 28, No. 1–4 (2019)”; amount from the DUN grant: 64800 zł. Project 4: “Digitalisation of eight editions of the journal Logic and Logical Philosophy over the period 2018-19; Vol. 27, No. 1–4 (2018), Vol. 28, No. 1–4 (2019)”; amount from the DUN grant: 18600 zł.

ISSN: 1425-3305 (print version)
ISSN: 2300-9802 (electronic version)

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