Unreliability of markets – collusion of players. Detection methods in the light of the competition policy

Sylwester Bejger

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/EiP.2009.010


This paper presents a review of a methodology of detection of overt or tacit collusion in the light of the modern competition policy based on the game theory. In this paper a consistent research procedure for identification and detection of collusion is proposed. It also systematizes the existing statistical and econometrical methods for the detection and assessment of collusion in industry according to such parameters as: result of a method, amount of statistical data necessary to apply a method, sensitivity to errors in an econometric model specification.


competition policy; game theory; collusion of players


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