Bożena Borkowska

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/EiP.2010.008


The political economy literature presents a number of models that explain how political institutions influence economic outcomes. The aim of this paper is presentation of theoretical and empirical research that explain fiscal policy outcomes under proportional and majoritarian elections, and under presidential and parliamentary forms of governments.

Full Text:

PDF (Polish)


Arrow K.J., A difficulty in the concept of social welfare, “The Journal of Political Economy” 1950, vol.58

Austen-Smith D., Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation , “Journal of Political Economy” 2000, vol.108 , no. 6 ;

Banaszak B., Prawo konstytucyjne, C.B. Beck, Warszawa 2008.

Coate S., Morris S., On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, “ Journal of Political Economy “ 1995, vol. 105, no. 6

Diermeier D., Feddersen T, Cohesion in legislatures and the vote of confidence procedure, “American Political Science Review” 1998, vol. 92, no. 2

Keller R., Bleaney M., Gemmell N., Fiscal Policy and Growth: Evidence from OECD Countries, “ Journal of Public Economics “ 1999, vol. 74

Lizzeri A., Persico N., The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Rules , “American Economic Review” 2001, vol.91, no.1 ;

Milesi-Ferretti G.M. , Perotti R., Rostagno M., Electoral Systems and Public Spending , “Quarterly Journal of Economics” 2002, vol.117, no. 2 ;

Persson T., Tabellini G., Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes, “ American Economic Review “ 2004, vol. 94, no. 1

Persson T. , Tabellini G., Trebbi F. , Electoral Rules and Corruption, “ Journal of European Economic Association “ 2003 , vol. 1 , no. 4

Siedlecka E. Mniej władzy dla prezydenta, „Gazeta Wyborcza” z dn. 25.08.2009

Wybranowski W., Urodzaj na konstytucje, „Rzeczpospolita” z dn. 2.09.2009.

ISSN 1898-2255 (print)
ISSN 2392-1625 (online)

Partnerzy platformy czasopism