What is the Role of Imagination in Emotion?

Abstract

Over the last forty years most scholars have viewed emotion as some type of evaluative propositional attitude, usually identified as belief or judgment, which is often accompanied by physiological sensations and feelings. Historically, the role of imagination in emotions has been ignored, or when it has been mentioned, has not been sufficiently explored. In this essay I challenge the prevalent cognitivist view, and I argue that often times imagination through its medium of mental pictures can better explain our emotional experiences. In particular, I examine a case of irrational fear and a case of humiliation where the requisite evaluative beliefs are missing, and I show that even though mental pictures are non- propositional, as they don’t require concepts for their realization, they are in a better position to explain emotions that lack an evaluative propositional attitude such as belief or judgment. Given that mental pictures, like propositional attitudes, are intrinsically intentional and representational, they are also able to account for the intentionality of the emotion, and, as a result, they can identify it as the kind of emotion it is.