The Phenomenology of Bodily Perception

Abstract

Since this is a colloquium on phenomenological and experimental approaches to cognition I’d like to set up the problem I want to address in terms of two of the different strands that we find in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about the phenomenology of the body. One of these strands is profoundly insightful. The other one, however, seems to me to be lacking in plausibility - or rather, to put it less confrontationally and more in keeping with the spirit of the colloquium, the second strand seems to stand in the way of there being a certain type of fruitful interaction between phenomenological and experimental approaches to cognition. As far as I can see (and I’m very much open to correction at this point) Merleau- Ponty was of the opinion that they came as a package. What I would like to do in this short presentation is sketch out a line of thought that prises them apart.