The Mind-Body-Body Problem
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/ths.2003.002Keywords
Mind-Body-Body Problem, consciousness, animalism, cognitive ethology, human embodiment, naturalistic dualismAbstract
The aim of this paper is to offer a solution to the Mind-Body-Body Problem. The solution, in a nutshell, is that the living and lived body (Leib) is metaphysically and conceptually basic, in the sense that one’s consciousness, on the one hand, and one’s corporeal being (Kórper), on the other, are nothing but dual aspects of one’s lived body. One’s living and lived body can be equated with one’s being as an animal', therefore, this solution to the Mind-Body-Body Problem amounts to an “animalist” version of the dual aspect theory. On this view, every conscious individual creature is literally identical with its living and lived body (Leib) or the animal that it is; in particular, each consciousReferences
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