Nowy zarys filozofii umysłu
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/RF.2019.026Słowa kluczowe
świadomość prerefleksyjna, intencjonalność, samoświadomość, wiedza pierwszoosobowaAbstrakt
Współczesna filozofia umysłu to przede wszystkim program dotyczący analizy tego, co mentalne. Struktura tego programu rysuje się na tle badań nad prerefleksyjną, niezapośredniczoną i nieintencjonalną świadomością. W jego ramach prowadzone są rozważania nad samoświadomością, wiedzą pierwszoosobową, świadomością intencjonalną, świadomością czasu i świadomością własnego istnienia. Te cech y umysłu stanowią rodzaj pomostu między internalizmem a eksternalizmem w filozofii umysłu i języka. Wewnętrzne własności stanów mentalnych wskazują na to, że stany mentalne nie podlegają naturalizacji, a tym samym fizykalizm ma swoje granice.
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