On Contemporary Philosophy of Mind From the 1950s Years to the Present
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/RF.2015.001Słowa kluczowe
Philosophy of mind, mind-body problem, externalism, internalism, cognitive sciencesAbstrakt
The aim of the paper is to present the main conceptions in the cotemporary philosophy of mind. The debate is narrated in two ways: The first approach concerns the ontology of mind, with the questions such as: What is the nature of mind?; What is the relation between mind and body?; Is the mind reducible to its physical basis? The second approach has an epistemological character where especially the problem of self-knowledge in the frame of the discussion between externalism and internalism is pointed out. The last part of the article gives an evaluation of the actual situation in the philosophy of mind which on the one hand tries to evolve in the direction of cognitive science but on the other hand stays in the frame of the traditional philosophy. The reason of it is the nature of the questions, which cannot be answered only by means of scientific disciplines. It means that in contrast to the cognitive science the philosophical account of the mind-body problem is the preferred one.
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