Incorrect Responses in First-Order False-Belief Tests: A Hybrid-Logical Formalization
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2020.003Słowa kluczowe
logic in cognitive science, hybrid logic, natural deduction, false- belief tests, perspective shiftAbstrakt
In the paper (Braüner, 2014) we were concerned with logical formalizations of the reasoning involved in giving correct responses to the psychological tests called the Sally-Anne test and the Smarties test, which test children’s ability to ascribe false beliefs to others. A key feature of the formal proofs given in that paper is that they explicitly formalize the perspective shift to another person that is required for figuring out the correct answers – you have to put yourself in another person’s shoes, so to speak, to give the correct answer. We shall in the present paper be concerned with what happens when answers are given that are not correct. The typical incorrect answers indicate that children failing false-belief tests have problems shifting to a perspective different from their own, to be more precise, they simply reason from their own perspective. Based on this hypothesis, we in the present paper give logical formalizations that in a systematic way model the typical incorrect answers. The remarkable fact that the incorrect answers can be derived using logically correct rules indicates that the origin of the mistakes does not lie in the children’s logical reasoning, but rather in a wrong interpretation of the task.
Bibliografia
Areces, C., and B. ten Cate, 2007, “Hybrid logics”, pages 821–868 in P. Blackburn, J. van Benthem and F. Wolter (eds.), Handbook of Modal Logic, Elsevier.
Arkoudas, K., and S. Bringsjord, 2008, “Toward formalizing common-sense psychology: An analysis of the false-belief task”, pages 17–29 in T.-B. Ho and Z.-H. Zhou (eds.), PRICAI 2008: Trends in Artificial Intelligence, volume 5351 of “Lecture Notes in Computer Science”, Springer-Verlag.
Arkoudas, K., and S. Bringsjord, 2009, “Propositional attitudes and causation”, International Journal of Software and Informatics 3: 47–65.
Arslan, B., N. Taatgen, and R. Verbrugge, 2013, “Modeling developmental transitions in reasoning about false beliefs of others”, pages 77–82 in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Cognitive Modeling, Ottawa: Carleton University.
Baron-Cohen, S., 1995, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind, MIT Press.
Baron-Cohen, S., A.M. Leslie and U. Frith, “Does the autistic child have a ‘theory of mind’?”, Cognition 21: 37–46.
Birch, S.A.J., and P. Bloom, 2003, “Children are cursed: An asymmetric bias in mental state attribution”, Psychological Science 14: 283–286.
Birch, S.A.J., and P. Bloom, 2007, “The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs”, Psychological Science 18: 382–386.
Blackburn, P., T. Bolander, T. Braüner and K.F. Jørgensen, 2017, “Completeness and termination for a Seligman-style tableau system”, Journal of Logic and Computation 27: 81–107.
Bolander, T., 2018, “Seeing is believing: Formalising false-belief tasks in dynamic epistemic logic”, pages 207–236 in Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game-Theoretical Semantics, Springer International Publishing.
Braüner, T., 2011, Hybrid Logic and its Proof-Theory, volume 37 of Applied Logic Series, Springer.
Braüner, T., 2013, pages 186–195, “Hybrid-logical reasoning in false-belief tasks”, in B.C. Schipper (ed.), Proceedings of Fourteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK). Available at http://tark.org.
Braüner, T., 2014, “Hybrid-logical reasoning in the Smarties and Sally-Anne tasks”, Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23: 415–439. Revised and extended version of (Braüner, 2013).
Braüner, T., 2015, “Hybrid-logical reasoning in the Smarties and Sally-Anne tasks: What goes wrong when incorrect responses are given?”, pages 273–278 in Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Pasadena, California: Cognitive Science Society.
Braüner, T., P. Blackburn and I. Polyanskaya, 2016, “Second-order false-belief tasks: Analysis and formalization”, pages 125–144 in Proceedings of Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation (WoLLIC 2016), volume 9803 of “Lecture Notes in Computer Science”, Springer-Verlag.
Braüner, T., P. Blackburn and I. Polyanskaya, 2020, “Being deceived: Information asymmetry in second-order false belief tasks”, Topics in Cognitive Science (in press).
Chomsky, N., Aspects of the theory of syntax, MIT Press, 1965.
Conan Doyle, A., “The Musgrave Ritual”, in The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes, Harper Bros., 1894.
Gallese, V., and A. Goldman, 1998, “Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2: 493–501.
Gopnik, A., and J.W. Astington, 1988, “Children’s understanding of representational change and its relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance-reality distinction”, Child Development 59: 26–37.
Gordon, R.M., 1986, “Folk psychology as simulation”, Mind and Language 1: 158–171.
Gordon, R.M., 2009, “Folk psychology as mental simulation”, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University. On-line encyclopedia article available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/folkpsych-simulation.
Jørgensen, K.F., P. Blackburn, T. Bolander and T. Braüner, 2016, “Synthetic completeness proofs for Seligman-style tableau systems”, pages 302–321 in A.M. Lev Beklemishev, S. Demri (ed.), Proceedings of Advances in Modal Logic 2016, volume 11 of Advances in Modal Logic, College Publications.
Mitchell, P., E.J. Robinson, J.E. Isaacs and R.M. Nye, 1996, “Contamination in reasoning about false belief: an instance of realist bias in adults but not children”, Cognition 59: 1–21.
Polyanskaya, I., 2019, “Second-order false belief reasoning by children with autism: A correlation and training study”, PhD thesis, Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University, Denmark.
Prawitz, D., 1965, Natural Deduction. A Proof-Theoretical Study, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm.
Prawitz, D., 2005, “Logical consequence from a constructivist point of view”, pages 671–695 in S. Shapiro (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Oxford University Press.
Rips, L.J., 1994, The Psychology of Proof: Deductive Reasoning in Human Thinking, MIT Press.
Rips, L.J., 2008, “Logical approaches to human deductive reasoning”, , pages 187–205 in J.E. Adler and L.J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations, Cambridge University Press.
Seligman, J., “The logic of correct description”, pages 107–135 in M. de Rijke (ed.), Advances in Intensional Logic, volume 7 of “Applied Logic Series”, Kluwer, 1997.
Stanovich, K.E., 1999, Who is Rational? Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning, Lawrence Erlbaum.
Stenning, K., and M. van Lambalgen, 2008, Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science, MIT Press.
Stanovich, K.E., and R.F. West, 2000, “Individual differences in reasoning: Implicationations for the rationality debate”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23: 645–726.
van Ditmarsch, H., and W. Labuschagne, 2007, “My beliefs about your beliefs – a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic”, Synthese 155: 191–209.
Verbrugge, R., 2009, “Logic and social cognition – the facts matter, and so do computational models”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 38: 649–680.
Wellman, H.M., D. Cross and J. Watson, 2001, “Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false-belief”, Child Development, 72: 655–684.
Winskel, G., 1993, The Formal Semantics of Programming Languages: An Introduction, Foundation of computing series, MIT Press.
Pobrania
Opublikowane
Jak cytować
Numer
Dział
Statystyki
Liczba wyświetleń i pobrań: 639
Liczba cytowań: 0
