Beall-ing O
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2019.028Słowa kluczowe
Beall, Hume’s Thesis, Prior’s Dilemma, Weak KleeneAbstrakt
In “A neglected reply to Prior’s dilemma” Beall [2012] presents a Weak Kleene framework where Prior’s dilemma for Hume’s no-ought-fromis thesis fails. It fails in the framework because addition, the inference rule that one of its horns relies on, is invalid. In this paper, we show that a more general result is necessary for the viability of Beall’s proposal – a result, which implies that Hume’s thesis holds in the proposed framework. We prove this result and thus show that Beall’s proposal is indeed viable.Bibliografia
Beall, Jc, 2012, “A neglected reply to Prior’s dilemma”, pages 203–208 in J. Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 28, Springer, Dordrecht. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3983-3_15
Beall, Jc, , 2016, “Off-topic: A new interpretation of Weak Kleene logic”, Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (6). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v13i6.3976
Bochvar, Dmitri A., and Merrie Bergmann, 1981, “On a three-valued logical calculus and its application to the analysis of the paradoxes of the classical extended functional calculus”, History and Philosophy of Logic 2 (1–2): 87–112. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445348108837023
Francez, Nissim, 2019, “On Beall’s new interpretation of WK3”, Journal of Logic, Language and Information 28 (1): 1–7. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10849-018-9274-6
Pigden, Charles (ed.), 2010, Hume on Is and Ought, Palgrave-Macmillan. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-29688-6
Prior, A.N., 1960, “The autonomy of ethics”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38 (3): 199–206. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048406085200221
Russell, Gillian, and Greg Restall, 2010, “Barriers to implication”, in [Pigden, 2010].
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