Models of possibilism and trivialism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2012.010Słowa kluczowe
Keywords, possibilism, trivialism, anti-trivialism, semantic minimalismAbstrakt
In this paper I probe the idea that neither possibilism nor trivialism could be ruled out on a purely logical basis. I use the apparatus of relational structures used in the semantics for modal logics to engineer some models of possibilism and trivialism and I discuss a philosophical stance about logic, truth values and the meaning of connectives underlying such analysis.Bibliografia
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