What is a genuine intuitionistic notion of falsity?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2012.001Słowa kluczowe
intuitionism, truth, falsity, negationAbstrakt
I highlight the importance of the notion of falsity for a semantical consideration of intuitionistic logic. One can find two principal (and non-equivalent) versions of such a notion in the literature, namely, falsity as non-truth and falsity as truth of a negative proposition. I argue in favor of the first version as the genuine intuitionistic notion of falsity.
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